Smart card based authentication schemes are used in various fields like e-banking, e-commerce, wireless sensor networks, medical system and so on to authenticate the both remote user and the application server during the communication via internet. Recently, Karuppiah and Saravanan proposed an authentication scheme which is based on password and one-way cryptographic hash function. They have used a secure identity mechanism i.e., users' and server's identity are not public. Thus, the user and the server do not send their identity directly to each other during communications. In this paper, we have found out that their scheme does not overcome the reply attack and also there is a fault in the login phase, which makes their scheme is not perfect for practical use.
Introduction
Smart card based mutual authentication system provides a facility where both communicators can verify each other during the online services. For this purpose, in single server environment based authentication system, the users do their registration for one time to a server to get services from that server for several times. After registration, each user gets his/her smart card form the server. By using their smart card, users get services from the server via public channel through internet. A good user authentication scheme should follow the following properties:
• Efficient login phase so that, the smart card can recognize the wrong inputs from the users before going to send login message to the server.
• Users can freely change their password with or without help from the server.
• The strong mutual authentication should satisfy.
• Perfect forward secrecy should hold so that, the computed shared session key is only known to the user and the server during that communication session.
• Communication overhead must be less so that, the authentication scheme provides good efficiency.
• The design scheme should resist the all possible attacks such as, insider attack, guessing attack, smart card stolen attack, forgery attack, man-in-middle attack and so on.
There are many password based authentication systems [1, 2, 3, 4] in the literature. In 2012, Chen et al. [5] proposed a robust smart card-based remote user password authentication scheme. In 2013, Kumari and Khan [6] showed that Chen et al.'s scheme cannot resist impersonation attacks and insider attacks, and they then presented an improved scheme. In the same year, Li et al. [7] also showed that Chen et al.'s scheme cannot ensure perfect forward secrecy and that it cannot detect incorrect passwords in the login phase, and they then proposed an improved scheme. Recently, Karuppiah and Saravanan [8] proposed a password based user authentication scheme in single server environment to provide the robustness of the authentication system. They claim that their scheme follows the above properties which make their scheme better than related schemes. But, in this paper, we have shown that there is a fatal error in login phase of their scheme so that, their scheme is no more applicable for practical use. Besides, we have pointed out the disadvantage in login phase which may mount replay attack on their scheme. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the brief review of Karuppiah and Saravanan's Scheme. Section 3 shows the weaknesses of Karuppiah and Saravanan's Scheme. Finally, the conclusion appears in Section 4.
Review of Karuppiah and Saravanan's Scheme
In this section, we will briefly discuss the Karuppiah and Saravanan's scheme [8] , in which we try to use the same notations as presented in their paper. Their scheme consists of five phases namely, initialization phase, registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and password change phase.
Initialization Phase
A server S selects two large prime numbers p and q. Further, the server chooses a generator g of a finite field in Z * p . Then, the server computes n = p × q and φ(n) = (p − 1) × (q − 1). Then, the server chooses an integer number e such that gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1 and 1 < e < φ(n). The server computes an integer d such that d = e −1 mod φ(n) and y = g d mod n. Finally, the server declares y as a public key of it and keeps < d, p, q > as secret.
Registration Phase
When a new user Ui wants to register to access the server S, this phase is invoked. The user Ui freely selects his/her identity IDi, password P W Di and a random number b. Then, the Ui computes h(b ⊕ P W Di) and sends IDi, h(b ⊕ P W Di) to the server S for registration. After receiving the registration message IDi, h(b ⊕ P W Di) , the server verifies credential of identity IDi. If it finds IDi in its database, that means, IDi is registered with some other user, and the server asks for a new identity to the user Ui. Otherwise, the server S issues a smart card that contains public parameters Cin, B1, g, y, n, h(·) for the user Ui after computing
mod n, where d and TR are the server's secret key and the registration time and date of user Ui respectively. Further, the server creates an entry for Ui in the database and stores an encrypted form of (IDi, TR) in this entry. Finally, the S sends the smart card to the user Ui. After getting the smart card, the user inserts the random number b into the memory of the smart card.
Login Phase
In this phase, the user inserts his/her smart card to the terminal and provides his/her identity ID * i and password P W D * i to the terminal. The terminal or smart card computes the following steps:
h(b⊕P W D * i ) mod n and compares B1 == B * 1 . If it holds good, the smart card computes the following steps; otherwise rejects the user Ui.
The smart card computes
, where a random number j is generated by the smart card. Then, the smart card sends a login request message B2, M, C to the server S.
3. After receiving the login request message B2, M, C from the user Ui, the server S computes B
3 ) and checks the validity of the user Ui. If it is valid proceeds to the next steps; otherwise rejects the login message.
The server S computes
and checks M * == M . If the equality holds, proceeds to next steps; otherwise rejects the login message.
r+t mod n, where Ts and r are the current time and date of the server S and a random number generated by the server S. Then, the server sends a reply message X = h(C1), r, Ts to the user Ui at time Ts.
6. After receiving the reply message X = h(C1), r, Ts from the server S at time T , the smart card checks whether (T − Ts) ≤ △T or not. If it holds good, the smart card proceeds to next; otherwise rejects the reply message of the server S.
The smart card computes t
r+t * mod n and checks h(C2) == h(C1). If it holds good, the smart card proceeds to next; otherwise rejects the reply message of the server S.
The smart card computes M1 = (h(C2 ⊕ IDi))
T mod n, where T is the current time and date of the smart card reader clock. The smart card sends a message Z = M1, T to the server S.
Authentication Phase
After receiving the message Z = M1, T from the user Ui at time Ts, the server checks whether (Ts − T ) ≤ △T or not. If it holds good, the server performs the following steps; otherwise rejects the the message Z = M1, T of the user Ui.
The server computes M2 = (h(C1 ⊕ IDi))
T mod n and checks M1 == M2. If it is true, the server accepts the login request and grants permission to the user Ui; otherwise, the server rejects the login request.
2. After successful mutual authentication, the user Ui and the server S independently compute the common session key as S 
Cryptanalysis of Karuppiah and Saravanan's Scheme
In this section, we will analyze the Karuppiah and Saravanan's scheme [8] and will demonstrate the disadvantage and the faulty login phase.
Faulty Login Phase
In the Karuppiah and Saravanan's scheme, identity IDi of the user Ui and also the identity IDs of the server S are not public that means, user Ui's identity IDi is not stored into his/her smart card directly and also the user Ui does not send his/her identity IDi directly with the login message to the server S in login phase. For this purpose, to verify the legitimate user Ui, the server S stores an encrypted form of (IDi, TR) in its database during the registration phase and when a login message is received by the server, it computes B
3 ) and checks whether the derived IDi is present into its database or not. If the derived IDi is found into its database, the server computes the remaining steps of the login phase; otherwise, rejects the user Ui. The above procedure shows that unless the identity IDi of the user Ui is derived, the server can not recognize the user Ui. Similarly, to recognize the server S with its identity IDs, the user must know the identity IDs of the server. But, there is no procedure to know server's identity for the user Ui because, the IDs is not public and also the server S does not send IDs with the reply message directly to the user Ui in the login phase. The server sends reply message h(C1), r, Ts by computing C1 = (C * ) r+t mod n, where t = h(Ts ⊕ IDi ⊕ IDs ⊕ B ′ 3 ), r is a random number chosen by the server and Ts is the current time and date of the server S. According to the Karuppiah and Saravanan's scheme, after receiving the reply message h(C1), r, Ts from the server S, the user Ui computes t * = h(Ts ⊕ IDi ⊕ IDs ⊕ B3), where Ts is known to the user from the reply message, Ui knows his/her identity IDi, B3 (= y j mod n) is also known to the user because, he/she computes this parameter during the login phase and IDs is unknown to the user Ui. Though the user Ui does not know IDs, he/she computes t * = h(Ts ⊕ IDi ⊕ IDs ⊕ B3). This is a fatal error of the Karuppiah and Saravanan's scheme. Thus, the Ui can not compute t * = h(Ts ⊕ IDi ⊕ IDs ⊕ B3) without knowing IDs. Hence, the Karuppiah and Saravanan's scheme is not perfect for practical use.
Disadvantage
The login request message B2, M, C is depended on only a random number j generated by the smart card as B2 = g j mod n,
, where TR is the registration time and date of the user Ui. TR is a fixed parameter because, one user can register to the server only one time with his/her identity IDi. But, the user can access the server for several times after performing the valid registration procedure only one time. We assume that the previous login request message of the previous session between a user Ui and the server S is stored in the server end. After getting login request message form Ui for a new session, S checks the current login request message with previous login request message. If they are same, S rejects the current login request message to avoid replay attack. An adversary traps the login request messages for some sessions ST1, ST2, . . . , STm with ST1 < ST2 < · · · < STm, where STi < STj means STi is a pervious session than STj . Suppose, the adversary sends the trapped login message to S in any session from {ST1, ST2, . . . , ST m−1} to the next session, say, ST m+1. S accepts the login request message of the adversary. To resist replay attack in Karuppiah and Saravanan's scheme, the server has to store all the previous login request messages for all the users to check with the current login request message. It is not an efficient technique where server takes more time to search and compare the messages only to resist reply attack.
Conclusion and Future Scope
We have shown that Karuppiah and Saravanan's scheme has a fatal error in login phase so that their scheme is impractical for real world application. Further, we have also shown the disadvantage of their scheme. In future, we will improve their scheme to overcome the fatal error in login phase as well as eliminate the disadvantage of their scheme.
